Why Blaming The Military Police For The SAS Coverup Completely Misses The Point

Why Blaming The Military Police For The SAS Coverup Completely Misses The Point

The headlines coming out of the Independent Inquiry relating to Afghanistan read like a predictable script. Military police investigators step forward to testify that their hands were tied, that senior officers obstructed probes into alleged extrajudicial killings by elite units, and that institutional self-preservation trumped the rule of law.

The lazy consensus writes itself: a tale of brave investigators thwarted by brass-bound bureaucrats protecting rogue operators in the shadows.

It is a clean narrative. It is also entirely naive.

Focusing on whether military police were blocked from following specific threads of evidence treats the symptom while ignoring the structural design of modern military accountability. The entire apparatus of state-sanctioned violence is built on a fundamental paradox. You cannot deploy lethal, clandestine units into asymmetric warzones to operate outside conventional rules of engagement and then expect a conventional police procedural when things go dark.

The Institutional Fiction of Battlefield Policing

Let us define terms immediately. The Royal Military Police (RMP) are not an independent civilian constabulary like the Metropolitan Police or the FBI. They wear uniforms, answer up the chain of command, and exist within a hierarchy where operational utility routinely outweighs judicial puritanism.

When an inquiry hears testimony that investigations were dictated from above, commentators gasp at the political interference. But this reveals a deep misunderstanding of how military command structures function under pressure. Senior commanders do not obstruct investigations out of cartoonish malice or a desire to harbor lawless killers. They do it because admitting systemic failure at the tip of the spear threatens the entire credibility of the institutional deterrent.

Imagine a scenario where a military police unit is given total, unfettered autonomy to prosecute elite operators mid-conflict. The operational friction would be immediate. Trust between conventional support structures and special forces would evaporate. The brass knows this. The Ministry of Defence knows this. The system is engineered to absorb pressure, manage fallout, and protect institutional reputation long before a file ever hits a civilian prosecutor's desk.

The Convenient Shield of Secrecy

The ongoing inquiry into SAS operations in Helmand province between 2010 and 2013 has exposed millions of pages of documents, delayed disclosures, and a wall of silence where operators routinely invoke privilege against self-incrimination.

Outraged pundits point to this obstruction as proof of a broken justice system. They demand tighter oversight, independent civilian watchdogs embedded on the battlefield, and stricter policing of special forces.

This is wishful thinking.

Civilian oversight cannot function effectively inside a theater of war where the primary currency is lethal ambiguity. If you subject elite reconnaissance and direct-action units to the evidentiary thresholds of a domestic murder trial while bullets are flying, you destroy their operational viability. States maintain special forces precisely because they operate in the grey spaces where normal laws of armed conflict are stretched to their absolute breaking points.

When the state unleashes these units, it enters an implicit contract: do the things we cannot admit to doing, and in exchange, we will manage the aftermath.

When investigators complain they were stopped from following the evidence, they are acting surprised that the contract exists. They expected a peacetime criminal investigation in the middle of a counter-insurgency quagmire.

The Real Failure Is Not The Coverup

The scandal is not that military police were prevented from pulling the thread. The scandal is the institutional hypocrisy that pretends military accountability can ever be truly independent while remaining tethered to the state that authorized the missions in the first place.

If governments want absolute adherence to civilian criminal law during foreign interventions, they have a straightforward option: stop deploying secret military units to wage unacknowledged wars.

Until then, inquiries into special forces misconduct will continue to perform the same ritual. Investigators will testify about obstruction. Officials will apologize for delayed disclosures and administrative failures. Recommendations will be written, filed away, and ignored.

Stop pretending the system is malfunctioning. It is operating exactly as designed.

NH

Naomi Hughes

A dedicated content strategist and editor, Naomi Hughes brings clarity and depth to complex topics. Committed to informing readers with accuracy and insight.